Plug-In Electric Vehicles Parking Lot Equilibria With Energy and Reserve Markets

Abstract

This paper proposes a comprehensive model for the interactions of the plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) involved parties. An aggregator with mixed resources is assumed to be the interface between the parking lot (PL) and the upstream energy and reserve markets. On the other hand, the interactions of the PEV owners and the PL are also modeled as they impose restrictions to the PL's behavior. Therefore, a bilevel problem is constructed where in the upper level the objective of the aggregator is to maximize its profit through its interactions, and in the lower level the PL maximizes its own profit limited to the preferences of PEVs. The objectives of the upper and lower levels are contradictory; hence, an equilibrium point should be found to solve the problem. In this regard, the duality theorem is employed to convert the bilevel model to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The model is implemented on the IEEE 37-bus network with added distributed generations. Various cases are thoroughly investigated and conclusions are duly drawn.