Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition

dc.contributor.author Luís Filipe Martins en
dc.contributor.other 5973 en
dc.date.accessioned 2020-01-29T13:59:51Z
dc.date.available 2020-01-29T13:59:51Z
dc.date.issued 2019 en
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with n = 3 players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with n = 3 players. We show that unlike the case of n = 2, when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment. © 2019 World Scientific Publishing Company. en
dc.identifier.uri http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/10793
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919500051 en
dc.language eng en
dc.title Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition en
dc.type Publication en
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