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Title: Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game
Authors: Maria Margarida Carvalho
João Pedro Pedroso
Ana Viana
Issue Date: 2017
Abstract: Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. This claim led to the study of multi-hospital exchange markets. We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game. The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial time.
metadata.dc.type: article
Appears in Collections:CEGI - Articles in International Journals

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