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Title: Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures using self-composition
Authors: José Bacelar Almeida
Manuel Barbosa
Jorge Sousa Pinto
Issue Date: 2013
Abstract: Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-the-shelf tools. This is due to the domain-specific characteristics of the code, involving aggressive optimizations and non-functional security requirements, namely the critical aspect of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we extend previous results supporting the practicality of self-composition proofs of non-interference and generalizations thereof. We tackle the formal verification of high-level security policies adopted in the implementation of the recently proposed NaCl cryptographic library. We formalize these policies and propose a formal verification approach based on self-composition, extending the range of security policies that could previously be handled using this technique. We demonstrate our results by addressing compliance with the NaCl security policies in real-world cryptographic code, highlighting the potential for automation of our techniques.
metadata.dc.type: article
Appears in Collections:HASLab - Other Publications

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