Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4737
Title: | Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures using self-composition |
Authors: | José Bacelar Almeida Manuel Barbosa Jorge Sousa Pinto Vieira,B |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
Abstract: | Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-the-shelf tools. This is due to the domain-specific characteristics of the code, involving aggressive optimizations and non-functional security requirements, namely the critical aspect of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we extend previous results supporting the practicality of self-composition proofs of non-interference and generalizations thereof. We tackle the formal verification of high-level security policies adopted in the implementation of the recently proposed NaCl cryptographic library. We formalize these policies and propose a formal verification approach based on self-composition, extending the range of security policies that could previously be handled using this technique. We demonstrate our results by addressing compliance with the NaCl security policies in real-world cryptographic code, highlighting the potential for automation of our techniques. |
URI: | http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4737 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2011.10.008 |
metadata.dc.type: | article Publication |
Appears in Collections: | HASLab - Other Publications |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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P-004-ZVC.pdf | 467.2 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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